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Chapter One

EXPECT
THE UNEXPECTED:
HERACLITUS, KANT
AND
THE ÆSTHETICS OF FINE WINE

A

ctually, you do not even have to taste this wine,” said the

owner of a high-end fruit market who, due to his own passion, sold
wine as well. “Just smell it!” He was right. I opened that 1947
Giacomo Borgogno Barolo Riserva a year later to celebrate my wife’s
35th birthday, when the wine was also 35 years old. I expected that
the wine would be good, a library release only one year earlier from
what was considered the best Barolo vintage of the 20th century by
a well-regarded producer. The wine was wonderful to smell and,
indeed, to taste. More significantly, it was so different from other
Barolos I had tried that its unique character was stunning.
Soon after, while teaching a university philosophy class on the Pre-Socratics, I
found the story of my experience with that wine useful in exploring Heraclitus’s fragment,
“Expect the unexpected.” What fascinated Heraclitus was the opportunity for learning that
can emerge when one experiences an unexpected event or sensation. While most may
fear the unexpected, I have profited from Heraclitus’s advice and learned to seek the
learning that can only be gained by going down unknown paths.
Reading about wine maturing in the bottle and fortunately tasting a few aged wines
like that ’47 Borgogno early in my wine journey kindled two desires: to enjoy regularly the
special qualities of properly matured wines and to study this development process. Thus
began my cellar. Reflecting on the experiences of many years, I can say that my efforts
have been well rewarded. Today, my cellar offers wines that have significantly improved
by aging. My study of the process of wine maturation has had a repeating “lesson.” More
wines turn out better rather than worse from aging and some quite different from what I
anticipated.
A 22-year-old 1990 Château La Louvière was an instructive example being both
quite good and pleasantly a step above my expectations. While variable outcomes from
aging wine is expected, some individual variations are, well, “unexpected” in Heraclitus’
sense. Among the very best wines, a few mysteriously stand out so distinctly as to
constitute a class by themselves. These few wines surpass many that were “merely” very,
very good. The ’47 Borgogno was one of these special wines. Their unique quality prompts
the core question of this essay: What qualities characterize those extraordinary wines?
The answer is not as clear as one would imagine. The literature of wine gives us regular
guidance in selecting wines for cellaring. Discussions about where wines are made and
how they are made are invaluable. A vast array of tasting notes and ratings can be
considered before buying, as well as to determine the best time to open mature wines.
Closer inspection of wine literature discloses, nevertheless, an absence of my core
question. While it is easy to find suggestions of which wines taste better than others, it is
far more difficult to find any discussions of why one wine tastes better than— let alone
fundamentally different from—another.
The fundamental question of what is the nature of a truly extraordinary wine can be
posed more broadly as, “What is the nature of beauty?” Having taught many university
courses in the philosophy of art and beauty, I have experience struggling with the difficult
questions about the nature of beauty. When discussing painting, music, theater, dance,
sculpture, or wine, writers consistently turn to style or to history or to formal issues rather
than to the nature of the beautiful. I am perplexed but also quite intrigued that when we
arrive at this core question in aesthetics, we find ourselves unexpectedly not where we
would have anticipated. If beauty matters to us, would we not expect to be able to
articulate what it is that defines the best in individual works of art? This absent
explanation calls for thought. Thinking, in this context, consists of building a path from the

starting point of realizing we are “lost.” The recognition that one is lost requires asking
unusual questions. The question of what distinguishes a great wine is our starting point in
asking about the essence of beauty as a whole.
Just as “studying wine” can clarify philosophical questions, so a reciprocal turn to
philosophy can help understand fine wine. I have no expectation that any philosopher can
provide an answer to the question I am raising about great wines, any more than they
provide explanations of the essence of great works of art. I have come to realize through
years of teaching that the nature of the beautiful is a profound, complex question. The
thinking needed does not involve finding someone who already knows the answer but,
rather, the far more difficult task of deciding to build one’s own path. What philosophy can
do is provide questions for us that can move us beyond the points we have successfully
reached in understanding fine wine. One such philosopher is Immanuel Kant1 (1724–
1804).
Kant invites our attention for several reasons. He is the leading
figure of modern European philosophy in that virtually all European
philosophers of the past two centuries have begun with a careful reading
of his three great works, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), The Critique
of Practical Reason (1788), and The Critique of Judgment (1790). In the
latter, Kant begins a tradition among modern European philosophers
(including Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) of regarding
art as one of the most significant human achievements (if not the most
significant) and not merely as an embellishment of the good life. Kant’s
“first critique” addresses the human capacity for knowledge and is
presented in the context of developments in science in the age of Newton.
His second critique addresses the possibility of rational moral action. The
third critique addresses the capacity of humans to apprehend beauty in
art and in nature.
Kant’s elevated appreciation of art comes at the same time as the mostly
serendipitous emergence of the fine-arts museum. The Uffizi Gallery and the Musée du
Louvre opened and the collection that became the Hermitage was started during Kant’s
lifetime; in the following century, the Rijksmuseum, the Prado, the National Gallery, and
the Kunsthistorisches Museum opened. In the same period, there were two crucial
developments in the history of wine. There were technological
advancements in glass bottles and in corks. Glass bottles started out as
carafes to carry wine from casks to tables. Corks were used as stoppers
for the carafes. The use of bottles and corks evolved quickly, and by the
time of Kant’s death they were being used to stack and cellar modern
fine wine2. The second development came in the middle of the 19th
century, when Pasteur provided a scientific explanation of the essential
role of yeasts in fermentation. This confluence of the elevation of the
status of art in a culture and the emergence of the fine-art museum,
combined with the technological advances that made fine wine possible
and major discoveries in the science of winemaking, was certainly
fortuitous.

Unidentified painter, Immanuel Kant (painted portrait), marked as public domain, more details on
Wikimedia Commons
1

The Evolution of the Port Bottle: dated bottles from the collection of Berry Bros. & Rudd .Grateful
thanks for permission from them to reproduce their illustration.
2

The Critique of Judgment invites us to examine carefully the aesthetic judgments
we make about things. Each of Kant’s critiques explores a human capacity, or, as Kant
calls them, faculties. Faculty is used to underscore the need in each case to develop these
core human cognitive capabilities. We have a faculty for knowing that allows us to
discover scientific knowledge. We also have the capacity/ faculty to act upon moral
decisions. Third, he suggests we have a faculty for judging things aesthetically. This third
faculty is separate from both knowing things and from acting. We exercise this third
faculty when we stand before things of nature or products of art in order to recognize
their beauty and to appreciate them as beautiful. This aesthetic cognition turns out to be
as complex as acquiring scientific knowledge or acting upon moral principles.

Canary wine is pleasant to me
The Critique of Judgment begins with an example of a judgment—“Canary wine is
pleasant”— indicating that Kant had some knowledge of wine. Canary sack was well
known before Kant’s time. Shakespeare’s Mistress Quickly proclaims in Henry IV, Part 2
Act 2, Scene 4
But i’ faith, you have drunk too much canaries, and that’s
A marvellous searching wine, and it perfumes the blood
Ere one can say, “What’s this?”
The Canary wine tasted by Kant or Shakespeare was a “fine” wine from an earlier era. It
was sweet and fortified so that it would last longer than typical wines.
Kant argues that this statement should be modified to “Canary wine is pleasant to
me.” The point of reference is thus shifted from the wine to the person making the
assessment. The suggestion that such a judgment is valid for the individual presents a
long-held view about beauty—ie, “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” This deep-seated
belief marks the starting point of popular aesthetics. Being “subjective,” aesthetic
assessments are considered to be valid and therefore need neither explanation nor
scrutiny. In this view, we are entitled to our individual judgments about beauty. What
matters is the articulation of individual preference. Kant leads us in precisely the opposite
direction. He invites us to look critically at the very aesthetic assessments we are so
accustomed to making.
Aesthetic judgments are, for Kant, indeed subjective. By subjective, however, Kant
means something fundamentally different from what we mean in everyday language. He
chooses the term “subjective” to underscore the fact that when we say an object is
beautiful, we do so based upon a sensation that occurs in ourselves. When I say that
Vermeer’s The Milkmaid is beautiful, I base this judgment on a feeling I experience when
looking at that painting. The aesthetic judgment—what Kant calls a Judgment of Taste—
refers to nothing in the thing of beauty itself but rather to a feeling of pleasure in the
subject.
If the basis of the judgment of taste is in the feeling of pleasure (or pain) in the
subject, one could still agree with the standard relativity thesis about aesthetics. Some
tasters will, as I did, experience pleasure when tasting a 40-year-old 1971 Château
Suduiraut, while others may feel little pleasure, if any. Kant, aware of this possibility,
provides a crucial distinction. An authentic judgment of taste rests upon a unique kind of
pleasure, a satisfaction in the subject that is not influenced by prejudice. Kant identifies
three possible forms of prejudice (he calls them interest) that must be identified and
eliminated if we are to make a true aesthetic judgment. Each area of possible interest
(prejudice) can be applied to wine. Each concerns pleasures in the subject; but these are
pleasures that are not relevant to aesthetics.

The pleasure of knowing
One form of interest we experience has to do with knowledge. Pleasure can
certainly be associated with knowing. Turning on the radio and hearing a piece of music
you have heard many times prompts the question, “What is that?” The experience of
recognizing that it is the Gigue from Bach’s Cello Suite No.3 is a pleasant experience—
perhaps even more if one also correctly “guesses” that it is Rostopovich rather than Casals
performing. Wine tasters know this pleasure. From the novice recognizing that a wine is a
Zinfandel and not a Cabernet, to Harry Waugh correctly identifying an unknown wine as a
1928 Château Montrose, there is always some satisfaction to be felt here. This pleasure is
the basis for the enjoyable “game” of blind tasting.
Another version of the pleasure of knowing comes in descriptions of the taste of a
wine listing similarities to other smells and tastes (cherries, leather, pipe tobacco,
peaches...). One must pay careful attention to what one smells and tastes to be able to do
this. Recognizing the separate components of the taste of a wine is certainly a necessary
part of serious wine tasting. Nonetheless, it presents a list of qualities of the object
recognized by the taster rather than paying attention to pleasure in the taste experience
of the taster. The pleasure of naming a wine or identifying similarities to other tastes is
pleasure of recognition. Because there is this pleasure in the experience of knowing, Kant
says that we must keep in mind that the judgment of taste is not based on the object or
what we know about it but, rather, must be based solely on the feeling we have
experiencing the object.
A serious problem that knowledge can create in aesthetic judgment comes when an
informed taster is presented with a legendary wine. How likely is one to judge a 1968
Beaulieu Vineyards Private Reserve Cabernet Sauvignon, a 1961 Pétrus, or a 1929
Château Léoville-Poyferré to be not good, despite their reputations? The recognition that
one is tasting a legendary wine, a highly rated wine, or simply a wine from a preferred
region, producer, or grape will understandably be enjoyable. We must put this pleasure
aside if we hope to make the kind of judgment Kant proposes. Of the three ways we are
likely to be prejudiced or interested in a wine, the interest based on what we know poses
the least difficulty.

The Pleasure of the Individual
A much more powerful and influential pleasure each of us experiences comes from
things that appeal to us as individuals. I may prefer the color blue; someone else, yellow.
We accept each other’s preferences because neither claims that their preference is more
beautiful. Blue gives me pleasure, and yellow does the same for you. Clearly we have
many such individual preferences that determine choices. How do such individual
preferences affect judgments of the quality of wine? The complexity of this question
becomes apparent when we note that while I am not required to pay more for my blue
sweater than I would for a yellow one, I am asked to pay more for a Barolo than for a
Dolcetto. Price, of course, does not define quality, but it does contain an indication of
quality.
Although we cannot give reasons for our preferences, the pleasure we experience
from things that appeal to us is quite strong. These strong pleasures complicate the
process of making judgments about wine. Individual prejudice comes from many sources,
yet because of the way it works it is hard to detect or overcome. How many serious wine
tasters, educated on French wine, find Italian, Californian, and Spanish wines only
second-rate or peasant wine? A historic case study is in Michael Broadbent’s Great Vintage

Wine Book (1991) that devotes, as one would expect, many pages to red Bordeaux (43)
and red Burgundy (48). Less immediately understandable are the allocations of three
pages to Loire wines, a page and a half to New Zealand wines, but (only) one and a
quarter pages to Spanish wines (half a page for Rioja and Penedès and three quarters of a
page to Vega Sicilia). Certainly the coverage reflects his tasting experience more than
quality judgments. The proportions infer individual-cultural preferences as well. I know
this kind of preference. Almost all my wines come from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Germany, or Hungary.
A second form of individual preference or prejudice identified by Kant comes from
desires we have, instead of from the education we have received. Kant introduces this
pleasure in the saying, “Hunger is the best sauce.” Hunger was unquestionably the best
sauce for me when I started my wine cellar. In California in the early 1970s, I found a
market filled with thin 1971 and ’72 red wines. I did become “hungry” for wines with body
and found that “sauce” first in 1974 Zinfandels (particularly in the new late-harvest, highalcohol Zinfandels. I bought Gran Cru Late Harvest and Ridge Vineyard’s Lytton Springs,
Geyserville, and Fiddletown Zins with high tasting scores in Connoisseur’s Guide to
California Wines. Tasting these wines several years later, I found that none approached
the expectations I had of them. Many, to be sure, became good wines, nice complements
to roast pork, but not anything more. My early evaluation of these wines was what Kant
would call interested. My choices were prejudiced by my personal desires, as well as by
inexperience in estimating the aging potential of young wines. If we want to make
aesthetic judgments about wine, we need to remove the influence of such interests.

The Pleasure in the Good
Thus far, Kant has asked us to look at the pleasures all of us experience that
interfere with true aesthetic judgment—the pleasure of knowing and the pleasure of what
satisfies us purely as individuals. The third way interest (prejudice) can interfere with
judging a thing of beauty is rooted in the pleasure we experience when considering things
we conceptually consider to be “good.” One way to understand Kant’s point is to recall the
pleasure we feel in relation to a well-designed, well-made tool—that “good” knife that
really works well. We derive pleasure from such things, says Kant, because we notice that
this chef’s knife does a job better, comes closer to our concept of what it ought to be, than
any other. What is important is that we have a concept of what sort of thing the tool ought
to be, and we compare the object at hand to this concept. Conversely, we all know the
pain we experience when trying to use a poorly designed, poorly made tool.
The pleasure we experience when considering things that closely resemble our
concept of what they ought to be extends beyond the realm of tools. We say that a meal
is good, and thus gives us pleasure, for several reasons, including the fact that it meets
our concept of what a meal ought to be. If served the best soufflé au Grand Marnier one
had ever tasted as an appetizer and a delicate consommé as dessert, a 40-year-old
Graham’s Oporto as apéritif and an Emilio Lustau Almacenista Manzanilla at the end of the
meal, one might say or at least think to oneself, “Great dishes and wines; terrible meal.”
Undoubtedly we have concepts of what a wine ought to be, and we compare specific wines
to that concept. Kant suggests that, in having a concept of what a wine ought to be, we
are interested and thereby may not be able to make a true aesthetic judgment.
How might concepts affect decisions about wines? One possibility has to do with the
evolution of the making of wines from Cabernet Sauvignon grapes in California. As
interest in wine in California began to grow dramatically in the 1960s, the predominant
approach was to use 100 percent Cabernet Sauvignon grapes. If we ask why this
approach became so widespread, part of the answer may come from the application of a

concept about how Cabernet Sauvignon should be made rather than from a choice based
on aesthetic judgment.
Where did the pure Cabernet Sauvignon wine concept originate? It seems quite
likely that it came from Bordeaux, where Cabernet Sauvignon is the dominant grape in
the most famous wines of the Haut-Médoc. These wines are, nevertheless, blended with
as many as four grapes—Merlot, Cabernet Franc, Malbec, and Petit Verdot. Looking more
closely for the origin of this 100 percent concept, we can turn to the 1855 Classification of
Bordeaux wines. The two Médoc châteaux that attracted the most attention from
California tasters in the 1960s and ’70s were Latour and Mouton Rothschild. Latour has 80
percent of its vineyard planted in Cabernet Sauvignonand Mouton has 90 percent. It is not
difficult to imagine a concept that says if 90 percent is good, 100 percent ought to be
even better. Over the past 30 years, this concept-driven approach has evolved into the
making of both unblended wines and “Bordeaux blends” in California.
Another question about whether concepts rather than taste influenced a
winemaking style comes from Italy. In the 1960s, Piero Antinori began experimenting with
the traditional formula for Chianti Classico that required a blend of red grapes (Sangiovese
and Canaiolo) and white grapes (Trebbiano and/or Malvasia). He also wanted to make a
new flagship wine for his traditional family winery, Marchesi Antinori. The result was
Tignanello, and it quickly evolved into being a single-vineyard, small oak barrel-aged wine
made from Sangiovese (80 percent) and two non-traditional grapes (in Italy), Cabernet
Sauvignon (15 percent) and Cabernet Franc (5 percent). This multi-variable experiment
by Antinori eventually produced the new wine category Super-Tuscan. One can ask about
each of the variables chosen—single vineyard, barrique aging, eliminating all the white
grapes, or replacing a traditional red grape with two non-traditional grapes—and wonder
whether the decision to use each was more concept-driven or based on a judgment of
taste. Single-vineyard bottling certainly allows the expression of terroir that many
connect to superior wine production. Vintage Port, with its blending of vineyards,
complicates the question a bit. Barrique aging done judiciously may also produce finer
wines. In the case of both these changes in grape-variety usage, more questions about
concept-driven decisions seem to arise. Blends of red and white grapes achieve great
outcomes in Côte Rôtie and Rioja and, in a different context, Champagne. The success of
blending the Cabernets with Sangiovese is the most controversial choice aesthetically.
Strong advocates and opponents of this practice persist.
Kant’s argument about aesthetics generally is that if we can recognize and then set
aside the satisfactions we experience in knowing things, the satisfactions we experience
due to private conditions in each of us individually, and the satisfactions we experience in
relation to things that match our concepts of what they ought to be, the better we will be
able to make aesthetic judgments. It is important to note in what has been said so far
that, for Kant, such judgments are free judgments. The freedom comes in not being
influenced by the different factors just discussed that give us pleasure. Because the
pleasures we experience in these ways are as strong as they are, setting aside their
influence is not at all easy. One has to make an effort consciously.

Disinterested Contemplaton
The judgment of taste is, paradoxically, also a judgment based upon a pleasure
experienced by the subject. What we have done thus far is to identify pleasures that we
do experience but are different from the unique pleasure to be experienced in relation to
the beautiful. To emphasize the difference, Kant says that an aesthetic judgment must be
disinterested. Rather than being swept away by—controlled by—the all-too-common
pleasures of personal prejudice, we can become free to let the thing of beauty be what it

is, and we can be free to contemplate it as it is. This contemplation is essential to
aesthetic judgment.
Contemplation is, precisely, an intellectual activity and, in fact, is most importantly
an intellectual activity. But it is also a special kind of intellectual activity. Contemplation
includes being involved with the sensuous yet at the same time being beyond pure
emotion or pure passion.Through contemplation we escape being controlled by our
personal sensuous satisfaction. Many have a passionate attachment to one or perhaps
several wines. Once it was, briefly, for me Zinfandel; today, Barolo (among several
others). Barolo has been my most consistent wine passion over the years, and I know that
when presented with a glass of Barolo I need to move beyond my love of the taste of the
Nebbiolo grape if I want to judge the wine properly. Through disinterested contemplation
this can be done.

Kantian play
In saying that aesthetic judgments must be free, we have already touched upon
one of the positive aspects of the judgment of taste. This freedom is the necessary first
step. The freedom we achieve in purely contemplating the thing of beauty allows the
activity to become an occasion for play. This play is distinctly Kantian in character in that
it is an activity of the mind. There is, to be sure, pleasure associated with playful activity.
We must explore the play of the mind with the thing of beauty in order to understand the
pleasure we experience in this unique kind of play.
The pleasure that we experience when disinterestedly contemplating a thing of
beauty is determined, Kant says, by a state of mind we experience in ourselves. This
mental state is caused by a relationship that develops between the two mental abilities
that we use when examining each object presented to our senses. These two mental
abilities (Kant calls them cognitive powers) are the Understanding and the Imagination.
Put simply, the Understanding tells us about what is immediately presented to the senses.
An example for us could be the Understanding’s identification of “a liquid with distinct
color, temperature, smell, taste, and texture.” The Imagination starts to make connections
to previous experiences and suggests that this is a red wine. Going further, it is “a red
liquid that smells of vegetables, is slightly cooler than room temperature, smells of the
distilled essence of vegetables, and has a distinct volatility and lingers on the palate long
after swallowing.” The Imagination then compares what is immediately present to
previous experiences and suggests, “It is a red Burgundy reaching maturity.” In this way,
the Understanding and the Imagination work together to give a fuller picture of the object
we are experiencing.
When we are making an aesthetic judgment, however, our concern is not to
determine whether a thing is a Gevrey- Chambertin or a Volnay. We are not looking for
knowledge. Neither are we comparing what we are given to what we believe it should be.
We are not asking our cognitive powers to determine whether the wine we are tasting is
delicate as a Volnay should be. And we are not allowing a new passion for red Burgundy to
intrude. Instead, we simply “look at”—we contemplate what is given and ask nothing
further of our cognitive powers. In this state, says Kant, the Understanding and the
Imagination are allowed to play freely with what is being apprehended.
The Understanding and the Imagination are engaged with what our senses present but, in
this situation, are not required to perform their normal tasks. My cognitive powers could
certainly be controlled by my desire for the pleasure of tasting one of my favorite wines.
My cognitive powers could be required to perform the task of identifying where this red
Burgundy comes from because I get pleasure in successfully making such an
identification. I could expect from my cognitive powers an answer to the question of

whether this wine has adequate elegance for a premier cru Volnay. One’s cognitive powers
could be dominated by these questions and, in fact, normally are performing precisely
these tasks. In contemplation, the cognitive powers are not required to do these usual
tasks and are allowed to play freely with the complex of sensations present.

A special kind of pleasure
Sometimes, when our Understanding and our Imagination are allowed to play freely
with an object, we experience a special kind of pleasure. This special pleasure occurs,
says Kant, when the free play of our cognitive powers is extremely lively. This special
pleasure comes in the play of the cognitive powers when they animate each other. When
such lively play occurs in the mind, we linger over the activity of contemplation because
the contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. Kant identifies the thing of beauty as
the object that occasions such lively play of the cognitive powers that we linger over its
contemplation. The basis of this designation is the pleasure we experience in ourselves in
the free play of our cognitive powers.
George Saintsbury, in Notes on a Cellar-Book, wrote of a 30+-year-old 1846 red
Hermitage:
And as to the taste one might easily go into dithyrambs. Wine-slang talks of the
‘finish’ in such cases, but this wine was so full and so complicated it never seemed
to finish. You could meditate on it; and it kept up with your meditation (p.6).
The phrase “so full and so complicated” suggests that Saintsbury experienced a unique
pleasure in the lively play of his cognitive powers when “meditating” on this wine—and the
meditation strengthened.
In Kant and Saintsbury I find a path to pursue in seeking more understanding of
the question underlying this inquiry— how can I grasp what separates those few
extraordinary wines I have tasted from the others? If we wish to understand the beautiful,
we have to start from our own experiences of satisfaction in our own contemplating. One
clear example for me came with tasting a 1982 Poderi Marcarini Barolo Brunate that was
almost as old as Saintsbury’s Hermitage. This is a wine I know well,
having tasted vintages back to 1966 and having cellared vintages
since the 1974. Paolo Cordero di Montezemolo’s Enrico VI and
Marcarini’s Brunate are the most consistent high-quality Barolos in
my experience. Having tasted the 1982 Brunate since the mid-point
its development,I opened the mature bottle with high expectations.
The bouquet very clearly met my expectations. And so did the taste.
Indeed, both the bouquet and the taste exceeded my expectations.
In saying this, however, I am making what we have previously
identified as interested judgments. The wine met my concept of what
a mature Barolo “from one of the best vintages of the century” made,
as noted on the label, by winemaker Elvio Cogno ought to taste like. I have acknowledged
that I am fond of almost every wine made from the Nebbiolo grape. What, I asked myself,
elevated this wine above others I had tried (and still separates it) among a small number
of other Barolos in contrast to many fine Barolos I have tasted? What, to use Kant’s
language, made this wine beautiful?
Barolos are normally described as smelling and tasting of violets, truffles, tar, and
raspberries. Violets come closest for me, truffles as well, and sometimes raspberries. Tar
leaves me cold and makes me suspect that this term refers not to a specific taste or smell
connection but rather to the concentrated quality of smells and tastes particularly in
young Barolo. The ’82 Marcarini did indeed remind me of violets, truffles, and raspberries.

However, these comparisons indicate that the wine met a predetermined concept of
Barolo. What excited me was the manner in which this wine presented the smells rather
than the fact that it did contain those elements. The lively play of my Understanding and
Imagination was caused by the qualitatively different nature of the smells. I am using the
term qualitatively here very intentionally and in contrast to quantitatively. The bouquet of
this Barolo was not simply an instance of more of the same smells experienced in other
Barolos. The difference was that this wine possessed a unique combination of varying
quantities of the standard Barolo aromas. It was this unique combination that produced a
lively play of my cognitive powers animating each other to such a degree that I (almost)
only wanted to smell the wine. The “violets,” for example, were in the bouquet, but in a
way I had never experienced. That smell was concentrated on the one hand but also so
delicate and very precise. Both bouquet and taste had a depth that animated my
Understanding and Imagination, as did the finish of Saintsbury’s Hermitage. That depth
truly kept up with and strengthened my meditation upon it. It was a depth of many layers
rather than a single bass tone.

The beautiful is not universal
Two important points follow from the preceding reflections. First, I do not call this
Barolo the ideal Barolo; it is not distinct because it is the perfect model to which I can
compare other Barolos. That analysis, as already indicated, would involve an intellectually
constructed concept. Judgment based on the concept of the ideal would not be derived
directly from the pleasure (or pain) found in contemplating the object. To search for a
universal concept of the beautiful, says Kant, is fruitless and impossible. The pleasure I
experienced in tasting (moving to a different example) a 1987 R López de Heredia Viña
Tondonia Gran Reserva at 25 years old came from another absolutely singular collection
of smells and tastes.
The 1987 Viña Tondonia Gran Reserva was barrel-aged for eight years and bottleaged for ten years before release. I fully expected the classic Rioja taste profile, having
tasted Viña Tondonia Reservas since the 1970 vintage. My expectation of higher quality in
the Gran Reserva was certainly met. As I continued to taste the wine, my attention
became more and more focused on the experience of tasting. While the classic Rioja taste
components were certainly present, what dominated my observation was the combination
of youthful and mature taste simultaneously present. I recall struggling to express the
taste by asking rhetorically, “How could it still taste so young and so mature?” The
experience of tasting this wine was unique and deeply pleasurable. Other Rioja Gran
Reservas could also have an individual complex of smells and tastes that produce similar
lively play of the Imagination and the Understanding. To deserve the title beautiful as Kant
suggests it be used, they would have to do this as the ’87 Tondonia did: on an individual
basis. Experience tells me, however, that while other Rioja Gran Reservas I have tried
from Marqués de Murrieta, La Rioja Alta, and Bodegas Muga were wonderful wines, only a
very few produce pleasures of this kind. This is why Kant emphasized that all aesthetic
judgments are singular and refer to one experience at one time.
If aesthetic judgments are singular, have we returned to the territory of the entirely
individual? Kant says that we have not if we remain disinterested. If we are free from our
private preferences and from concepts of the good and allow our Understanding and
Imagination to play freely with the thing of beauty, then the pleasure we feel is a pleasure
others should experience. I can assume every other person who also allows the
Understanding and Imagination to play freely likewise would experience the pleasure of
the animated play of the cognitive powers that I experienced with that Marcarini Brunate.
The judgment of taste derives its universality from the universality of the cognitive
powers. Understanding and Imagination exist in each of us. Although normally engaged

with our personal concerns, the cognitive powers can be free from this private influence
and give us the pleasure of contemplation of the beautiful.

Beyond expectations
In a way, we have come full circle on the path we have been exploring. Heraclitus
gave us the starting guidance to expect the unexpected. We then started reflecting on a
long practice of cellaring selected wines. The expected goal of this activity was to curate
fine wines to their highest levels of development and to study the curatorial process itself.
The outcome has been, on the whole, very much as expected. Cellaring wines such as
Castello di Volpaia Chianti Classico began with the 1977 vintage and has included many
subsequent vintages because they develope into very good wines. I have learned that this
Chianti requires more time than most to reach maturity, but it rewards one’s patience. The
same rewards to one’s care of wine have come from many expected sources, including
others more from highly regarded producers in Bordeaux, Burgundy, and elsewhere.
These wines have been the core of the cellar. And in saying they are the core, I mean that
the expected has indeed been the outcome of taking care of them as they matured.
On the other hand, perhaps the most fascinating lesson I have learned is to expect
the unexpected. A few wines quite surprisingly stand well outside their expectations.
Again I am talking here about wines that for me meet Kant’s criteria of having produced a
lively play of my Understanding and Imagination and deserve the category of beautiful.
The surprise is not that the wines were expected to be ordinary. On the contrary, each
beautiful wine I have chanced upon was expected to be very, very good. Each has come
from highly regarded wine regions. Almost all come from the highest-ranked kinds of
wines in their regions, such as classed-growth Bordeaux or cru classé Burgundy. The
unexpected element is that most of these wines do not reach the level of beauty, despite
being unquestionably very fine. This is a refined experience of feeling lost. One expects
fine wines to be special, and they almost always are. But a few still keep our attention
filled with Mistress Quickly’s question: “What’s this?”
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